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The income distribution which results from the market 
mechanism is in no sense an absolutely ideal 
distribution…The distribution which a country considers 
fair and equitable is a matter of judgment, which can only 
be made on a foundation of ethical values. The process 
by which differences about this conception of fairness 
are settled is a political one; the economist has no right 
to make this judgment for society. He has the duty, 
however, to make clear the economic implications of 
policies designed to determine or alter the income 
distribution…”
(Eckstein 1958)
Outline
• Objectives in Resource Allocation
• Water Markets: What are they and why do we want them?
• Defining Property Rights Over Water
• Water Rights and Markets for Water in New  Zealand
• Example: Markets for water rights in Colorado
• Example: Water banks in Colorado and Idaho
• Concluding Thoughts and Areas of Future Research
• Maximize net social benefits from current and 
future allocations of water
– Efficiency versus equity
– Water (and the right to water) should move from low 
valued uses to high valued uses.
Objectives in Resource Allocation

Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District 
Water Deliveries, 1972-2000
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Observations
• Diversions versus consumptive use:
– Opportunity costs could be associated with 
diversions for activities that don’t 
consumptively use any water
– Reducing the amount diverted doesn’t 
necessarily increase net social benefits
• Location and amount of return flows 
matter
– Water should not necessarily be diverted to 
the activity with the highest value use 
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What are Water Markets?
• The phrase “water markets” is widely applied to describe 
a variety of settings which involve the buying and selling 
of water or the right to divert/consume water. Examples 
include:
– “Water banks”
– Markets for permanent shares
– Markets for ditch company shares
• Water markets define the conditions under which buyers 
and sellers can exchange water related property
• A particular market can be characterized by answers to 
the following: 
– What is being bought/sold?
– How are prices determined?
– Who are the buyers and sellers? What rights do they have?
Why Water Markets?
• Provide incentives that can lead to the efficient re- 
allocation of water
– “It is commonly argued that reallocating just 10 percent of 
agricultural water to municipal uses could boost municipal 
supplies by 50 percent West-wide.” Nichols et al. (2001)
• Provide “flexibility” in the ownership of water rights 
• Provide alternative source of supply for users with 
increasing demands
• Incentives related to the opportunity cost of water will 
impact:
– Investment in production and consumption technologies
– Types of activities/industries that develop
– Patterns of growth
• Water Rights owners benefit
Defining Property Rights for Water
• Water rights typically specify: the owners right to 
divert/consume a particular quantity of water
• Details often include:
– Location of use
– Type of Use
– Time of Use
• Specifying the right to transfer
• Additional Issues
– Priority versus Proportional
– Right to divert versus right to consume
When will Exchanges Occur?
• Buyers will purchase when the value of the 
resource received exceeds or is equal to the 
total cost of the good
• Sellers will sell when the value they receive is 
greater than or equal to the benefits they would 
have received from the resource if they did not 
sell
• Exchanges are most likely to occur across uses 
and regions (when allowed)
• A lack of transactions, by itself, does not 
necessarily imply that markets are not 
functioning properly
Water Markets and Rights 
in New Zealand
• Two levels of governance: RMA and Regional Councils
• The RMA
– Typically reported that RMA allows transfers conditional on regional 
approval of transfer
RMA- Section 136
(1) A holder of a water permit granted for damming or diverting water may transfer the whole of
the holder's interest in the permit to any owner or occupier of the site in respect of which the permit is
granted, but may not transfer the permit to any other person or from site to site.
(2) A holder of a water permit granted other than for damming or diverting water may transfer the
whole or any part of the holder's interest in the permit—
(a) To any owner or occupier of the site in respect of which the permit is granted; or
(b) To another person on another site, or to another site, if both sites are in the same
catchment (either upstream or downstream), aquifer, or geothermal field, and the transfer—
(i) Is expressly allowed by a regional plan; or
(ii) Has been approved by the consent authority that granted the permit on an
application under subsection (4)
Water Markets and Rights 
in New Zealand
• Regional plans characterized by
– Uncertainty in what the objective is
– Variability in how property rights are defined
• Different “types” of rights. Example: 
– Specification of Type “A” and Type “B” water rights
– Specification of explicit seasonal limitations
– Tremendous Variability in the extent to which markets 
for water are covered, ranging from no mention to: 
• Regional plans that specifically outline the conditions of the 
water market
• Place restrictions within the consent
– Example of differences in markets across regions
• Restricted to irrigators only during periods of low flow
Concerns Regarding the Use of 
Water Markets in New Zealand
• “there is a reluctance to participate in anything that might 
speed up change in land and water use within a 
catchment.” Robb et al. (2001)
• “Irrigators believed that water allocations would be 
bought up by towns and/or big industrial users, it would 
not come back to rural.” Kerney and Sinner (1997)
• “General consensus that no individual user should be 
able to make a windfall gain by selling permits the do not 
need.” Kerney and Sinner (1997)
Markets for Water Rights 
in Colorado
Markets for Water Rights in Colorado
• Markets for Permanent Shares
– Colorado Big-Thompson Shares
• Proportional Allocation
• Homogenous Shares
• Owner has right to return flows
• Minimal transactions costs associated with transfer of shares
– Native water 
• Allocation based on priority system
• Property right defined based on historical use
– Location, type, and timing of use
• Owner does not have right to return flows
• Transfers allowed conditional on no-injury to other users
• Transfers must be approved by court

DIVISION 2
PERCENTAGE OF TRANSFERRED WATER BY TYPE
2%
98%
DIVISION ONE
PERCENTAGE OF WATER TRANSFERRED BY TYPE
8%
87%
5%
NCWCD
PERCENTAGE OF WATER TRANSFERRED BY TYPE
26%
64%
9% 1%
Ag to Ag Ag to Non Ag Non Ag to Non Ag Non Ag to Ag
NCWCD 
Water Use versus Ownership
NCWCD 
Distribution of Transfers, 1979-2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210 225 240 255 270 285 300 315
SIZE OF TRANSFER (Acre Feet)
N
U
M
B
E
R
 
O
F
T
R
A
N
S
F
E
R
S
South Platte River Basin 
Distribution of Transfers, 1979-2000
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Arkansas Valley River Basin 
Distribution of Transfers, 1979-2000
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Example: Water Banks in Colorado
• Objectives
– Provide an alternative to permanent transfers of water 
out of agriculture and out of basin
– Reduce transactions costs associated with temporary 
exchanges of water
• Arkansas River Basin Water Bank (Co)
– Established in 2001 (active 2003) to allow for the 
temporary lease of water (1 year)
– Format: 
• Online bulletin board postings
• Price determined through interaction of buyer and seller
• Must be approved by State Engineer’s Office
• Water offered to in-basin sellers first
Example: Water Banks in Colorado (cont.)
• Activity
• Reasons no longer 
active
– Uncertainty associated 
with impact on 
permanent rights
– Difficulty using internet
– Time taken for approval 
too long (min 2 months)
Seller Quantity
Offer Price
(per AF) Transaction
Ag 47.32 $800 No
Ag 140.00 $800 No
Ag 135.51 $500 No
Ag 8.02 $1000 No
2003
Example: Water Banks in Idaho
• Objectives
• Water District 1 Rental 
Pool
– Established in 1979
– Prices determined by 
administrative board
– Prices differ depending on 
(a) location of buyer and (b) 
availability of supply
Reservoir Level Price 
per AF
Full $5
Not-Full
Category 1
$12
Not-Full
Category 1
$18
Example: Water Banks in Idaho (cont.)
Year Quantity Offered Irrigation Hydro-power Augmentation Total Rented
Percent of Total 
Offered
1990 306,000 152,000 68,000 220,000 72%
1991 205,113 85,677 99,000 184,677 90%
1992 9,954 9,954 0 9,954 100%
1993 408,240 38,974 249,000 287,974 71%
1994 432,171 75,888 356,282 432,170 100%
1995 582,405 37,197 255,000 363,290 62%
1996 636,586 19,024 250,000 269,024 42%
1997 693,305 11,328 224,500 235,828 34%
1998 764,699 7,890 223,221 231,111 30%
1999 727,461 9,136 148,397 157,533 22%
2000 336,934 60,333 215,650 275,983 82%
Quantity Rented for:
Concluding Thoughts and Future 
Areas of Research
• The potential for water markets in New 
Zealand lies in the ability to carefully 
define water rights and outline the 
conditions of transfer
• It is important to allow both markets for 
water and rights
• Uncertainty in how water rights are defined 
likely limits their value and reduces 
incentives to be more efficient
